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ABSTRACT 
The world is seeing more maritime disasters every year, in a variety of jurisdictions 
around the world. Many of these disasters cause a large number of deaths. As a 
result of those deaths, there is often pressure on the relevant authorities to prosecute 
the parties responsible. The master of the vessel may be the most obvious party to 
charge, but there may have been other parties responsible for the operation and 
management of the vessel whose negligent or reckless conduct contributed to the 
vessel’s demise. Despite the contributions of other parties, the master of a vessel may 
become a scapegoat, and, as a result, bear the brunt of any prosecution. There are 
several reasons why the master may receive the most blame in these situations. One 
of those may be that the law in force within the relevant jurisdiction does not provide 
particular criminal charges that apply to parties other than the master. This paper 
asks whether Australian law encourages prosecuting bodies to scapegoat the master 
of a vessel and whether this is demonstrative of the wider problem of seafarer 
criminalisation worldwide.  
 
Criminal law will be fit for its intended purpose if it provides prosecuting authorities 
with the means to prosecute those truly responsible for damage caused, and to 
prosecute those parties in an appropriate manner. In 2012, the Australian 
government spearheaded sweeping changes to domestic maritime law. Those 
changes brought several new criminal charges relevant to maritime disasters 
causing death, and amended previous charges. This paper looks to the law in 
Australia applicable to maritime disasters causing death and asks whether the laws 
are fit for their intended purpose. The research conducted is doctrinal, focussing 
particularly on the Navigation Act 2012 (Cth), the Marine Safety (Domestic 
Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 (Cth), and the Crimes at Sea Act 2000 
(Cth). 
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I INTRODUCTION 
By their very nature, maritime disasters can claim many lives. Between the 
beginning of 2014 and the middle of 2015, nearly 1,000 lives were lost in 
maritime incidents affecting domestic voyages.
1
 The legal responses to these 
disasters vary greatly. Some disasters causing death are the subject of 
prosecutions, others see civil suits, and some see no legal action whatsoever. To 
illustrate this issue, it may be useful to consider some examples. In January 2012, 
the Costa Concordia disaster in Italy claimed the lives of at least 30 passengers 
and crewmembers, out of a total of 4,229 persons on board the vessel at the time 
of the incident.
2
 The master of the vessel was charged with manslaughter and 
sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment.
3
 In that case of the Sewol ferry disaster 
in South Korea, 304 of 476 passengers died. The captain of the Sewol disaster 
faced the death penalty from prosecuting authorities, but was later sentenced to 
imprisonment.
4
 These cases may be contrasted with the case of the Filipino ferry 
Doña Paz. In December 1987, the MV Doña Paz collided with the MT Vector, 
causing 4,386 deaths and leaving only 24 survivors. Though there was a civil suit 
for the deaths caused, there were no criminal prosecutions whatsoever. These 
examples demonstrate how variable prosecutions for maritime disasters causing 
death may be. The question is: why is there such variation?  
 
A Criminalisation 
Despite the variability of outcomes, what is clear is that prosecuting bodies have 
become more willing to prosecute for maritime disasters over the last 30 years.
5
 
                                                 
1
 Koji Sekimizu, ‘Address of the Secretary-General’ (Speech delivered at the Ninety-Fifth 
Session of the Maritime Safety Committee, International Maritime Organisation 
headquarters, 3 June 2015) <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secre 
tary-GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/MSC-95-opening.a spx>. 
2
 Marine Casualties Investigative Body, Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports (Italy), 
Costa Concordia: Report on the Safety Technical Investigation (2013) 3-4. 
3
 ‘Costa Concordia Captain Schettino Guilty of Manslaughter’ BBC (online), 11 February 
2015 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31430998>. 
4
 Liz Fields, ‘Sewol Ferry Captain Escapaes Death Penalty in South Korea – Again’, Vice 
News (online), 28 April 2015 <https://news.vice.com/article/sewol-ferry-captain-escapes-
death-penalty-in-south-korea-again>. 
5
 See Simon Daniels, The Criminalisation of the Ship’s Master: A New Approach for the 
New Millennium (PhD Thesis, Southampton Solent University, 2012). 
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The greatest issue with this trend is that many prosecuting bodies seem to be 
prosecuting masters, even if they are not the only cause of the disaster or a cause 
of the disaster at all. The masters, quite simply, become the face of the maritime 
tragedy. Hart has explained this is a general risk faced by any individuals: 
 
The danger to the individual is that he will be punished, or treated, for what he is or 
believed to be, rather than for what he has done. If his offense (sic) is minor but the 
possibility of his reformation is thought to be slight, the other side of the coin of mercy 
can become cruelty.
6
 
 
There is great pressure placed on authorities to determine the guilty party or 
parties for a tragedy of large scale. The greatest source of this pressure is the 
media. Gold has said that ‘[t]he media adores maritime accidents’,7 and that 
adoration stems from the characters involved in the situation. A case in point is 
the Costa Concordia disaster where Captain Schettino represented ‘an irresistible 
villain as the world sought someone to blame for the…disaster.’8 This made him 
the focus of the prosecuting authorities and the general public alike. 
 
The master is usually on the ground following a maritime disaster, assuming that 
they have survived. This means that the relevant authorities may detain the master 
with relative ease. If a vessel from one state falls victim to an incident in the 
jurisdictional waters of another state, the prosecuting body is likely to arrest the 
party to which they have access. This even appears to be the case in domestic 
maritime disasters. In the recent Eastern Star case, the media reported that the 
master and chief engineer of the vessel had been arrested by the Chinese 
authorities while simultaneously reporting that an investigating body had found 
                                                 
6
 Henry M Hart, ‘The Aims of Criminal Law (1958) 23 Law and Contemporary Problems 
401, 407. 
7
 Edgar Gold, ‘Learning from Disaster: Lessons in Regulatory Enforcement in the 
Maritime Sector’ (1999) 8(1) Reciel 16, 16. 
8
 Michael Day, ‘Costa Concordia Trial: Was Captain Francesco Schettino really the Only 
One at Fault for the Disaster?’, The Independent (online), 15 February 2015 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/costa-concordia-trial-was-captain-
francesco-schettino-really-the-only-one-at-fault-for-the-disaster-10046725.html>. 
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that the vessel had capsized due only to particularly rough seas.
9
 The unofficial 
policy regarding maritime disasters seems to be ‘arrest first, ask questions later’. 
 
The maritime community is well aware of the issue of criminalisation. In 2012, 
the non-governmental organisation Seafarer’s Rights conducted a survey of 
seafarers on the topic of criminal law.
10
 The survey found that 8.27% of seafarers 
had faced criminal charges and 23.33% of those faced criminal charges whilst 
serving as masters.
11
 The community has voiced its serious concern about this 
trend.
12
 Seafarer’s Rights recently released a video explaining to seafarers the 
issue of criminalisation and giving advice as to how seafarers may mitigate the 
chance of unfair prosecutions against them.
13
 Unfair treatment by coastal states 
following a maritime disaster is one of the reasons that seafaring is becoming less 
attractive as a career option.
14
 
 
B The Difficulty for Seafarers 
Prosecuting individuals for recklessness or negligence causing death is not 
particular to the maritime industry. It is applicable in a general transport context, 
particularly in driving cases. However, the leading cases on the topic, in both the 
United Kingdom and Australia, are cases of serious medical negligence.
15
 The 
main difference between those situations in medicine and the maritime industry is 
that the former generally only causes a single (albeit tragic) death. Aviation 
                                                 
9
 Angela Meng, ‘Eastern Star Captain Says Ship Hit by Strong Gust and Capsized as it 
Turned to Face Wind, South China Morning Post (online), 5 June 2015 
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/1816951/eastern-star-captain-says-
ship-hit-strong-gust-and-capsized-it>. 
10
 Seafarer’s Rights International, SRI Survey: Seafarers and the Criminal Law (2nd ed, 
2013). 
11
 Ibid 6. 
12
 The area is also gaining academic focus. See, eg, Simon Daniels, The Criminalisation 
of the Ship’s Master: A New Approach for the New Millennium (PhD Thesis, 
Southampton Solent University, 2012). 
13
 Seafarer’s Rights International, Criminalization of Seafarer’s (5 September 2015) 
YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZhgHD_MEBo0>. 
14
 Edgar Gold, ‘Bloodhounds, Scapegoats and Fatcats: Criminal Action, Professional 
Duty and Corporate Responsibility in the Maritime Menagerie’ (2005) 24 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 251, 258. 
15
 See R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67. 
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disasters perhaps provide a better analogy for maritime disasters, as they are likely 
to cause a comparable numbers of deaths. The main difference, however, is that 
pilots do not often survive an airspace tragedy and, therefore, are not prosecuted. 
The particular qualities of a maritime disaster make it difficult to compare to other 
situations of negligence or recklessness causing death. 
 
Criminal law varies from country to country, yet ships sail across jurisdictions on 
a regular basis. This feature of shipping means that a master and their crew are 
constantly unaware of the different criminal liability regimes to which they may 
be exposed at any given time. White has said that ‘[i]t is important to operators of 
all types of vessels to know which set of laws apply to it, for what purposes and in 
what circumstances.’16 While international conventions seek to regulate certain 
aspects of ship management and operation, they do not specifically extend to 
criminalisation. Seafarers who are constantly travelling through many 
jurisdictions as part of their employment are subject to different criminal laws 
every time they enter a new maritime jurisdiction. It would be impossible for 
those seafarers to understand in detail the extent of their liability in each 
jurisdiction. Criminal liability in Australia, as with most other jurisdictions, is 
based on the well-understood maxim that ignorance of the law is not a defence.
17
  
 
C What This Thesis Will Do 
The criminalisation of seafarers is a serious issue, and one to which there is no 
simple solution. One thing that countries around the world can do to alleviate the 
issues faced by seafarers, is to ensure that their criminal laws applicable to 
seafarers are fit for their intended purposes. If the laws are fit for purpose, then the 
application of those laws will be less difficult, and seafarers will be treated by 
criminal law clearly, fairly and effectively. 
 
Australia is very fortunate not to have suffered many large-scale maritime 
disasters causing death; however, the nation may not be so fortunate in future. 
Were that situation to occur, would Australian law be fit for purpose? This paper 
                                                 
16
 Michael White, Australian Maritime Law (Federation Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2014) 343. 
17
 See, eg, Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 9.3, 9.4. 
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will analyse the laws in Australia applicable to maritime disasters causing death. 
The analysis will focus on maritime disasters which occur within territorial 
waters, and not beyond that limit. The analysis will extend to the Crimes at Sea 
Act 2000 (Cth), the Navigation Act 2012 (Cth) (the ‘Navigation Act’) and the 
legislation corresponding to the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) 
National Law Act 2012 (Cth) (the ‘National Law’). Each piece of legislation has 
been relatively untested, so the analysis will approach the law using parliamentary 
materials, academic commentary, legislation and case studies. 
 
In chapter one, this paper will analyse the extent to which Australia seeks to 
legislate and apply criminal law within Australian territorial waters and the area 
beyond. In chapter two, this paper will analyse the main purposes of criminal law 
from the perspective of maritime disasters causing death. In chapter three, this 
paper will analyse the relevant criminal offences under the Navigation Act 2012 
(Cth), the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 
(Cth), and state criminal law.
18
 In chapter four, this paper will analyse several 
case studies to determine whether, in the event of a maritime disaster, the law in 
Australia would serve its intended purpose.  
 
D People Smuggling and Maritime Disasters Causing Pollution 
Maritime disasters usually take one of two forms: loss of life or pollution damage. 
The laws relating to pollution have their own complex set of ethical issues relating 
to the criminalisation of environment-harming conduct.
19
 Although there are 
issues common to all maritime disasters, marine pollution disasters will not be the 
subject of this paper. Further, loss of life disasters usually take the form of 
commercial vessel disasters or people smuggling disasters. As there is a specific 
offence relevant to people smuggling disasters causing death under the Migration 
Act 1958 (Cth),
20
 those instances will, too, not be the subject of this paper. 
                                                 
18
 Any reference to ‘state’ includes the Northern Territory. 
19
 See, eg, Olagunju F Anthony, ‘Criminalization of Seafarers for Accidental Discharge 
of Oil: Is There Justification in International Law for Criminal Sanction for Negligent or 
Accidental Pollution of the Sea?’ (2006) 37(2) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 
219. 
20
 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 233B. 
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II JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT 
Before analysing the effectiveness of Australian criminal law to prosecute for 
maritime disasters causing death, it is first prudent to discuss the maritime 
jurisdiction of Australia’s criminal law. International law provides the external 
boundaries of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction, and domestic law regulates the 
seas from the baseline of Australia to that outer limit. Though this division of 
jurisdiction appears to be clear, there are issues posed by the limit drawn and by 
the way in which Australia regulates everything within that limit. This chapter 
will discuss the purpose of Australia’s splits in its maritime jurisdiction and the 
problems that they cause. 
 
A International Law 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) entered in 
force in Australia on 16 November 1994 and governs global relationships with the 
high seas. It has 157 signatories, including Australia. 
 
As stated in the preamble, the purpose of UNCLOS is, inter alia, ‘[to 
establish]…with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the 
seas and oceans which will…promote the peaceful use of the seas and oceans’.21 
UNCLOS, in effect, provides the international framework that defines the extent 
to which each signatory can legislate in their own maritime jurisdiction. In doing 
this, UNCLOS divides the seas into three main sections; the high seas, the 
exclusive economic zone (the ‘EEZ’), and the territorial waters. 
 
The high seas, which are also known as ‘international waters’, are considered to 
be the part of the sea which is beyond 200nm from the baseline of any coastal 
state.
22
 An exercise of jurisdiction in that area is dependent on several factors, 
including the flag state of the vessel.
23
  
                                                 
21
 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 
1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’). 
22
 The high seas are the waters beyond the outer limit of the EEZ. See UNCLOS art 57. 
23
 See Kate Lewins and Nick Gaskell, ‘Jurisdiction over Criminal Acts on Cruise Ships: 
Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps?’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 221 (‘Jurisdiction over 
Criminal Acts on Cruise Ships’). 
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Coastal state jurisdiction within the EEZ does not extend to criminal conduct. 
UNCLOS restricts the coastal state’s sovereign rights over the EEZ to ‘economic 
activity, marine scientific research and environmental matters’.24 As such, any 
vessels within the EEZ of Australia are unlikely to be subject to the criminal laws 
of the coastal state.
25
  
 
Figure 1. Maritime and airspace zones and jurisdictions.
 26
 
 
 
According to UNCLOS, a coastal state has jurisdiction over its territorial waters, 
subject to some restrictions. In particular, article 27 restricts a coastal state from 
exercising its jurisdiction to crimes committed on board a foreign ship which is 
                                                 
24
 See S Kaye, ‘Threats from the Global Commons: Problems of Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement’ (2007) Melbourne Journal of International Law 185, 186, referring to 
UNCLOS art 56. 
25
 Unless there is another ground other than physical jurisdiction on which the coastal 
state may base its jurisdictional claim. Though not the subject of this paper, it may be 
possible for a coastal state to impose criminal liability for environmental damage as that 
may fall within the scope of ‘protection and preservation of the marine environment’ in 
UNCLOS art 56.  See S Kaye, ‘Threats from the Global Commons: Problems of 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement’ (2007) Melbourne Journal of International Law 185, 186 
and K Lewins and N Gaskell, ‘Jurisdiction Over Criminal Acts on Cruise Ships: Perhaps, 
Perhaps, Perhaps?’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 221. 
26
 Clive Schofield, ‘Maritime Zones and Jurisdictions’ (Lecture delivered for School of 
Surveying and Spatial Information, University of New South Wales) 
<http://www.iho.int/mtg_docs/com_wg/ABLOS/ABLOS_Conf3/SESSION3.PDF>. 
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merely passing through the state’s territorial waters. Article 27 appears to be the 
only section relevant to a state’s jurisdiction over maritime disasters causing 
death. It states:
 27
 
 
The criminal jurisdiction of [a] coastal state should not be exercised on board a foreign ship 
passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in 
connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in the 
following cases: 
a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; 
b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the 
territorial sea; 
c) If the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship 
or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or 
d) If such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances. 
 
The coastal state will have jurisdiction of foreign vessels which are leaving 
internal waters at the time of the criminal offence or at the time of the discovery 
of the criminal offence.
28
 The coastal state will also not be allowed to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction if the criminal conduct that occurred on the vessel did so 
occur prior to the vessel entering territorial waters at all, or if the vessel is merely 
passing through territorial waters without entering internal waters.
29
  
 
In any event, Article 27 applies to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction on board a 
foreign ship. This makes the provision more relevant to incidents involving 
pollution,
30
 or criminal acts committed on board the vessel.
31
 If there were a 
maritime disaster in Australian waters, it is likely that the effect of the disaster 
would be felt by Australia (through rescue efforts and such). Therefore, the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction is unlikely to be disputed. Further, there are few 
                                                 
27
 UNCLOS art 27. 
28
 UNCLOS art 27(2). 
29
 UNCLOS art 27(5). 
30
 See A Pozdnakova, Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators of Ship-Source Pollution: 
International Law, State Practice and EU Harmonisation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2012), 96-100. 
31
 See Kate Lewins and Nick Gaskell, ‘Jurisdiction Over Criminal Acts on Cruise Ships: 
Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps?’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 221. 
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other countries close enough to Australian territorial waters that are likely to be 
affected equally. 
 
B The Crimes at Sea Scheme 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, the Commonwealth parliament passed the Crimes 
at Sea Act 2000 (Cth) (the ‘CSA’). The CSA serves three main roles. Firstly, it 
divides Australia’s geographical maritime jurisdiction into two distinct parts and, 
secondly, it outlines the legal jurisdiction applicable to those parts. The CSA also 
provides for the substantive laws of the Australian Capital Territory to apply the 
Australian vessels that are outside of the geographical limit of the CSA.
32
 
However, this jurisdiction will not be the focus of this paper. 
 
Schedule 1 of the CSA sets out the cooperative scheme for each state (and the 
Northern Territory) to pass as statute (the ‘Cooperative Scheme’).33 Each state has 
done this.
34
 The two geographical areas provided for by the Cooperative Scheme 
are the ‘inner adjacent area’ and the ‘outer adjacent area’.35 The Cooperative 
Scheme defines the inner adjacent area as including the area from the coastal 
baseline to 12nm into the ocean. This area is the territorial sea of the 
Commonwealth, as defined in UNCLOS. The outer adjacent area spans from the 
12nm limit of the inner adjacent area to 200nm. This reflects the EEZ.  
 
Clause 2 of the Cooperative Scheme deals with allocating criminal jurisdiction 
within these two areas. Subsection (1) states: 
The substantive criminal law of a State, as in force from time to time, applies, by force of 
the law of the State, throughout the inner adjacent area for the State.
36
 
 
                                                 
32
 The CSA provides for the substantive laws of the Jervis Bay Territory to apply to 
Australian ships outside of the adjacent area. See Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth) (the 
‘CSA’) s 6. The laws of the ACT are in force in the Jervis Bay Territory. See Jervis Bay 
Territory Acceptance Act 1915 (Cth) s 4A. 
33
 CSA sch 1 (the ‘Cooperative Scheme’). 
34
 See Crimes at Sea Act 1999 (Tas); Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (WA); Crimes at Sea Act 
1998 (SA); Crimes at Sea Act 2001 (Qld); Crimes at Sea Act 1999 (Vic); Crimes at Sea 
Act 1998 (NSW); Crimes at Sea Act (NT). 
35
 The CSA also deals with the Joint Petroleum Development area. See CSA s 6A. 
36
 Cooperative Scheme c 2(1). 
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Subsection (2) states: 
The provisions of the substantive criminal law of a State, as in force from time to time, 
apply, by force of the law of the Commonwealth, throughout the outer adjacent area for 
the State.
37
 
 
Figure 2. Division of Jurisdiction under the Crimes at Sea Scheme.
38
 
 
This means that, according to the CSA, the substantive law of each state will be 
applicable to all crimes committed from the baseline to the edge of the EEZ. The 
only difference between the two jurisdictions is the authority which enforces the 
law. As it is merely dividing the jurisdictional limits of domestic criminal law, the 
CSA scheme purports to apply to all vessels, Australian or foreign. 
 
                                                 
37
 Cooperative Scheme c 2(2). 
38
 CSA app 1. 
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There are two main concerns about the operation of the CSA. Firstly, the 
Cooperative Scheme is silent as to whether the substantive law of the state applies 
within the inner adjacent area to the exclusion of any Commonwealth law. During 
the Second Reading Speech for the Crimes at Sea Bill, it was said that ‘[i]f the 
offences are both a state offence and a Commonwealth offence, the investigating 
authority will follow the more stringent regime or procedures.’39 The Australian 
Federal Police say that there is not ‘sole set’ of criminal law applicable in 
Australian territorial waters.
40
 The purpose of the legislation is defeated if 
Commonwealth criminal law can apply in addition to the state criminal law, as 
clarity for seafarers is lost.  
 
The CSA provides an Intergovernmental Agreement, which is signed by the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General and a representative of each state.
41
 It divides 
the responsibility for administering and enforcing the law within the scheme. 
Though it is not specified as such within the Intergovernmental Agreement, it 
appears that only the Commonwealth DPP may enforce Commonwealth 
regulatory laws.
42
 If the state prosecuting authority is pursuing a charge, it may 
only charge for breaches of state law. With this, it appears that part of the decision 
as to which authority will prosecute will affect the charges that may be laid, 
despite the uniform system that the CSA purports to provide. 
 
The second issue relates to the application of state criminal law within the outer 
adjacent area. According the UNCLOS, a coastal state does not have the 
jurisdiction to enforce its own criminal law within the EEZ. As such, it appears 
that an exercise of criminal jurisdiction ‘conferred’ by the CSA could be in breach 
of Australia’s obligations under UNCLOS. However, a maritime disaster may 
present a different situation. Lewins and Gaskell have said that, though UNCLOS 
                                                 
39
 Second Reading Speech, Crimes at Sea Bill 1999 (Cth). 
40
 Australian Federal Police, Aide Memoire on Crimes at Sea (Endorsed on 16 September 
2013), 2. 
41
 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, Intergovernmental Agreement – Crimes at Sea 
2000, No GN 49, 12 December 2001.  
42
 Australia Maritime Safety Authority, Compliance and Enforcement Protocol: 
Navigation Act 2012 < https://www.amsa.gov.au/forms-and-
publications/Publications/AMSA354-CEP-NavAct.pdf>, 12. 
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may prevent criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on board a foreign 
vessel in the outer adjacent area, it may allow for criminal jurisdiction of its 
activities.
43
 
 
C Conclusion 
In summary, Australia’s maritime jurisdiction is bordered by UNCLOS, but is 
itself regulated by the CSA Scheme. The CSA Scheme does not seem to confer 
exclusive jurisdiction on the states and the Northern Territory, but it does provide 
that state law will underlie any maritime disasters causing death within Australia’s 
territorial waters. There is question as to the extension of that jurisdiction into the 
EEZ, but that will not be the focus of this paper. The current CSA system may be 
an improvement on the situation as it was previously, but it is by no means ideal.  
 
Under the CSA Scheme, there is still variance of criminal law application from 
state-to-state. This means that seafarers navigating around the coast of the 
continent are constantly subjected to varying laws. Further to this, seafarers are 
subject to two sets of law at any one time. When traversing Australia’s territorial 
waters, seafarers are expected to know, understand and comply with a set of state 
criminal law, as well as any overlaying Commonwealth regulatory criminal law. 
                                                 
43
 Kate Lewins and Nick Gaskell, ‘Jurisdiction Over Criminal Acts on Cruise Ships: 
Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps?’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 221, 232. 
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III THE PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
According to Gold, the main problem with the criminalisation of seafarers is not 
the fact that coastal states are enforcing their criminal law, ‘but rather how it is 
being used or misused’.44 In order to analyse the Australian laws applicable to 
maritime disasters causing death, it is important to consider the purpose for which 
criminal liability exists. This chapter will consider the overarching purposes of 
criminal law and analyse them within a maritime context. 
 
A Responsibility and Criminal Conduct 
Criminal law is universal within its jurisdiction and is inherently linked to 
morality and blameworthiness. Hart says that criminal conduct is ‘conduct which, 
if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal penalty and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.’45 As such, 
criminal law must do to things in order to be considered effective. Firstly, it must 
apply to all people and, secondly, it must punish blameworthy conduct.  
 
1 The Chain of Responsibility 
Within several industries, particular those of high technical skill, there are a 
number of parties responsible for the safety of the work that is completed. In 
medicine, for example, this may include the doctor, any nurses, the anaesthetist, 
the hospital administrators, and the manufacturers of medical supplies. For any 
criminal law, it is important for a prosecuting body to have the ability to properly 
prosecute the parties responsible for damage. In the maritime industry, the master 
and crew may be present on the vessel at the time of a disaster; however, there are 
many other parties that contribute to success (or failure) of a voyage. Any of these 
parties may be responsible for a maritime disaster causing death.  
 
                                                 
44
 Edgar Gold, ‘Bloodhounds, Scapegoats and Fatcats: Criminal Action, Professional 
Duty and Corporate Responsibility in the Maritime Menagerie’ (2005) 24 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 251, 257. 
45
 Henry M. Hart Jr, ‘The Aims of Criminal Law’ (1958) 23 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 401, 405. 
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Foley says that the term ‘safety chain’ is used throughout the maritime industry to 
represent this concept.
46
 According to the International Maritime Organisation’s 
International Safety Management Code (the ‘ISM Code’):47 
 
The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from the top. In matters of 
safety and pollution prevention it is the commitment, competence, attitudes and 
motivation of individuals at all levels that determines the end result. 
 
The parties within a maritime safety chain includes, but is not limited to, the 
owner, the master, the crew, the charterer, the manufacturer of the vessel, the 
designer of the vessel, and the classification society.  
 
Crainer explains that, the senior management of a vessel has the highest level of 
responsibility for the actions of a vessel at sea. He says that, with management, 
‘the safety ‘buck’ starts as well as stops’.48 This view, however, does not seem to 
be shared by the authorities that have been responsible for prosecuting some of 
the world’s most serious maritime disasters. 
 
The reason that senior management appear to avoid liability is that the apparent 
desire to determine a ‘culprit’ is fulfilled when the master is targeted. When a 
maritime disaster occurs, the scapegoat is ‘left to take the full brunt of the 
administrative frustrations of the port or coastal state’.49  
 
                                                 
46
 Vincent J Foley and Christopher R Nolan, ‘The Erika Judgment – Environmental 
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Criminal law will be effective if it can attribute liability for damage to the person 
who caused that damage, absent some defence. If the applicable criminal law is to 
be fit for its intended purpose, it must provide avenues for criminal liability to be 
appropriately allocated. If this purpose is accepted, then, in the case of maritime 
disasters causing death, an effective criminal law will provide the ability to 
prosecute each responsible member of the safety chain. 
 
B Criminal Negligence and Criminal Recklessness 
John Lang, trustee director for Nautilus International, has said of the issue of 
seafarer criminalisation that ‘masters are being crucified for what would have 
been regarded in other circumstances as an accident’.50 Maritime disasters are 
often referred to as ‘accidents’ as the outcome was not an intended cause of the 
conduct. That is, that the disaster was an ‘accident’ in the colloquial sense. The 
term ‘accident’, however, is a misnomer in a legal sense for these kinds of 
situations. Although the outcome may have been unintended, that does not mean 
that the person (or persons) responsible may escape criminal liability. One 
purpose of criminal law is to provide sanctions for behaviours that the community 
views as deserving punishment.  
 
Investigations of maritime disaster often reveal that the loss of death was the 
result of negligence or recklessness. In law, negligence and recklessness may have 
different meanings dependent on the context in which they are used. As 
criminalised conduct, the meaning of the terms is still variable. ‘Criminal 
negligence’ and ‘criminal recklessness’ are broad terms, both in their colloquial 
use and in a legal sense. They are not particular to one jurisdiction, or even one 
offence. While the concept of negligence is well-understood and mostly agreed to, 
there is controversy as to whether conduct lacking criminal intention should be 
criminalised. Hart is particularly concerned with the criminalisation of conduct 
which does not rely on a ‘guilty mind’.51  
                                                 
50
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1 The ‘Guilty Mind’ 
Criminal offending has developed along the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi 
mens sit rea, meaning ‘an act done does not make a person guilty of a crime 
unless that person’s mind be also guilty.52 This conceptualisation of offending has 
evolved into each criminal offence having a ‘physical element’ (equating to the 
‘actus reus’) and a ‘fault element’ (equating to the ‘mens rea’). The exception to 
this rule is strict liability offences.
53
 A physical element is established by the 
actions done (or omitted) by the accused person, and the fault element concerns 
their state of mind at the time of committing the offence. Though the definition 
differs slightly in each state, the physical element of a homicide offence is to 
‘cause death’.54 The fault element that is established will determine whether the 
appropriate offence is murder of manslaughter. The fault elements corresponding 
to murder and manslaughter vary from state to state. If one of the required fault 
elements for murder cannot be established, the appropriate charge will be 
manslaughter.
55
 
 
The most common types of fault element are intention, recklessness and 
negligence. Each may have a slightly different definition between state 
jurisdictions, and between the states and the Commonwealth, but they are very 
similar. The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides definitions of each possible 
fault element used in the established Commonwealth crimes.
56
 State common law 
may provide their own definitions of different fault elements; however, they will 
be largely the same as their Commonwealth counterpart. 
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Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 303; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 159; Criminal Code Act 
1913 (WA) s 280. In South Australia and Victoria, the principle is held at common law. 
See Lorraine Finlay and Tyrone Kirchengast, Criminal Law in Australia (Lexisnexis 
Butterworths, 2015) 100-117. 
56
 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 5.1. 
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(a) Intention 
If a Commonwealth criminal offence does not specify the fault element required 
for liability, the assumed fault element will be intention.
57
 Intention is defined in 
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) as follows:
58
 
(1) A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that 
conduct. 
(2) A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists or 
will exist. 
(3) A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
 
Consider the following case, in terms of murder: 
 
Scenario One. Captain Vanderkley is facing a mutiny of his crew. He decides to 
steer his vessel into submerged rocks in order to sink the vessel and kill the crew. 
The hull is breached and the vessel floods, but Captain Vanderkley escapes in a 
lifeboat. Several crewmembers die. 
 
The conduct of the master is definitely of a kind that should constitute a crime. In 
this case, the physical element of ‘causing death’ is clearly established. To 
establish a charge of murder, the requisite fault element is intention. The 
applicable test would be to have an ‘intention with respect to a result’, as death is 
the result that must have been intended in order to attribute culpability. The facts 
state that the master had the intention for death to result. Therefore, murder will 
be relatively simple to prove in a court. The situation becomes more complicated 
when the accused party does not intend the consequences of what did eventuate. 
 
(b) Recklessness 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides that:
59
 
(1) A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if: 
(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exist or will exist; 
and 
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(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to 
take the risk. 
(2)  A person is reckless with respect to a result if: 
(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstance known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take 
the risk. 
 
The general rule is that death caused by recklessness will be found where ‘the 
accused foresaw that death was a probable consequence of his or her actions, yet 
took the risk and performed those actions in any event.
60
 In Rofe, Brereton J 
further discussed the concept of ‘recklessness as to conduct’, which applies in 
cases when the reckless conduct itself is the physical element of the offence, such 
as reckless driving.
61
 
 
The case of Rofe concerned a charge of ‘reckless navigation’ under the Marine 
Safety Act 1998 (NSW). The accused was a member of the Royal Australian Navy 
who was responsible for adventure training activities. In the course of a ‘joy ride’ 
on a motorised inflatable boat, a passenger feel from the vessel and came into 
contact with the propeller. The victim suffered serious injuries amounting the 
grievous bodily harm. Though the case did not concern a death, it does illustrate 
conduct which will be considered to be reckless.  
 
Brereton J briefly discussed recklessness as it would apply generally within a 
commercial shipping context:
62
 
A vessel operator assumes the risk of striking a submerged object, with the grave 
potential consequences of the vessel sinking and its passengers drowning, but would not 
be said to be navigating recklessly, unless in the circumstances the risk was an obvious 
and serious possibility; for example, if he or she proceeded to sail through a channel in 
which there were known to be such objects. 
 
Consider the following case, in terms of reckless manslaughter: 
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Scenario Two. There are two routes through which Captain Vanderkley may 
navigate his vessel. The first is shorter, but is known to be very dangerous; it has 
been known to cause deaths. The second route is slightly longer, but safer. 
Captain Vanderkley chooses the shorter route. The vessel hits submerged rocks, 
the hull is breached and the vessel floods. Captain Vanderkley escapes in a 
lifeboat. Several crewmembers die. 
 
The risk-taking behaviour is of a kind that the law has chosen to criminalise, by 
deeming it to be reckless. The physical element of manslaughter charge seems to 
be slightly more difficult to establish, but factual and legal causation appear to 
have been met.
63
 As the death is the focus of the charge, the fault requirement for 
reckless manslaughter is to be ‘reckless with respect to a result’. The scenarios 
shows that the master was aware of a substantial risk of hitting rocks. A court may 
find that, with a sound alternative route available, it was unjustifiable to have 
taken the dangerous route. 
 
(c) Negligence 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides that: 
A person is negligent with respect to a physical element of an offence if his or her 
conduct involves: 
(a) such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person 
would exercise in the circumstances; and 
(b) such a high risk that the physical element exists or will exist; 
that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence.
 64
 
 
This definition reflects the position at common law,65 although the common law 
has struggled to enunciate such. To explain the type of conduct relevant to 
criminal negligence, the words ‘gross’ and ‘wicked’ have been used; however, the 
Lord Chief Justice in Bateman said that, regardless of the epithets used, criminal 
negligence: 
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[Goes] beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such 
disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the state and 
conduct deserving punishment.
66
  
 
The common law has previously reflected the position that recklessness was an 
example of conduct with was criminally negligent.
67
 This is no longer the case.
68
  
Consider the following case, in terms of negligent manslaughter: 
 
Scenario Three. Captain Vanderkley is required to check the navigational aids as 
he navigates. He does not check them at all. As such, he fails to notice that he is 
navigating his vessel into submerged rocks. The vessel hits the rocks, the hull is 
breached and the vessel floods. Captain Vanderkley escapes in a lifeboat. Several 
crewmembers die. 
 
As the master of the vessel has a duty of care to those on board, it is expected that 
the law will criminalise a serious breach of that duty of care which causes harm to 
others. The physical element of ‘causing death’ has been met, in this case. The 
fault element also appears to be established. There is a high risk that poor 
navigation of a sea-going vessel could result in damage to the vessel and 
subsequent loss of life. Further, as there appears to be such a great falling short of 
the standard of care required of the master, a charge of negligent manslaughter is 
likely to be established. 
 
Kirby J has said: 
‘In the overwhelming majority of cases, a person who causes death by aggravated 
criminal negligence will be regarded as extremely blameworthy. The criminal law, by 
fixing liability only on those who act with aggravated negligence confines liability to 
cases of very serious wrongdoing in the circumstances of moral blame.
 69
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Negligence is a failure to meet a standard of care. The most common occasion for 
this analysis is in cases of negligent driving. Lord Diplock said in Lawrence that 
‘in deciding this [the jury] may apply the standard of the ordinary prudent 
motorist as represented by themselves’.70 This is more difficult in maritime cases, 
due to a jury’s inexperience with the subject matter.71 
 
In the case of Rofe, Brereton J explains the distinction between degrees of 
negligence in forensic detail.
72
 He explains that, though ‘there is no doubt that 
criminal negligence and civil negligence are distinct concepts’,73 negligence in 
regulatory law (as opposed to in murder or manslaughter) exists when there has 
been a departure from the standard of care ‘to be expected of a prudent operator in 
all the circumstances.’74 That is, that the threshold is lower than with murder and 
manslaughter.  
 
2 Implications 
The community view is: 
‘[T]hat any person who has a work-related duty of care, but does not observe it, should be 
liable to a criminal sanction for placing another person’s safety at risk.’75 
 
Kirby J has said that ‘[s]ubjective intention does not enjoy a monopoly on moral 
culpability’.76 The law in Australia seems to reflect this perspective, by 
criminalising conduct which is reckless or negligent. As such, for the purpose of 
consistency, the law applicable to maritime disasters causing death should reflect 
the willingness of the lawmakers to criminalise recklessness and negligence.  
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C Penalties 
Past maritime disasters have demonstrated that ‘prevention is better than cure.’77 
However, a legal cure is still necessary when a disaster occurs. Criminal law 
should have effective penalties if it is to satisfy its purpose. There are two main 
penalties for criminal liability: imprisonment and monetary ‘penalty units’. 
Penalty units ‘[straddle] the line between civil and criminal sanctions.’78 They, in 
effect, represent a fine imposed on the offending party and may be imposed by an 
authoritative body without the need for trial.
79
 One penalty unit is currently equal 
to $180.
80
 That amount will increase incrementally subject to sub-section 4, which 
determines ‘indexation days’ commencing with 1 July 2018.81 This paper will not 
analyse theories of justice, but acknowledges that the most effective criminal laws 
may not always have the highest penalties. At the very least, the deterrence effect 
of the legal sanctions will hopefully go to preventing future disasters. 
 
E Conclusion 
Criminal law applicable to maritime disasters causing death should be fit for the 
general purposes required of criminal law. This includes, but is not limited to, 
application to responsible parties, criminalising appropriate conduct and providing 
effective sanctions. In order to apply to appropriate parties, the relevant laws must 
consider the ‘safety chain’ concept and be wary of allowing the master of a vessel 
to be blamed for an outcome that was otherwise not within his responsibility to 
control. To ensure they are criminalising appropriate conduct, lawmakers should 
consider the serious implications being negligent on a vessel may have to the 
safety of life. In order to provide effective sanctions, consideration should be had 
of the deterrent effect that strong penalties will have. 
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III THE RELEVANT LAW 
Many factors influence whether a maritime disaster causing death will lead to 
criminal charges. In Australia, a prosecuting body may have a suit of criminal 
charges available to utilise in prosecution of reckless or negligent conduct. There 
are several regulatory crimes that may be relevant, under several statutes, in 
addition to the crimes provided by state and territory criminal law under the CSA 
Scheme. The main relevant charges under state and territory law are murder and 
manslaughter. The main relevant Commonwealth statutes are:  
 the Navigation Act 2012 (Cth) (the ‘Navigation Act’); and 
 the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 
(Cth) (the ‘National Law’). 
 
This chapter will analyse each of these laws in order to determine whether they 
are fit for their respective intended purposes. Considering the issues as they are 
outlined above, the analysis will focus on (a) the conduct criminalised by the 
applicable laws (including defences to that criminalisation), (b) the parties to 
whom that liability may be imposed, and (c) the criminal penalties that may flow 
as a result of conviction. 
 
A State Criminal Law 
Pursuant to the CSA, the criminal law of each state will apply to vessels within 
the waters to which that state is adjacent. State criminal law is highly variable. 
Depending on the adjacent state, a seafarer may be subjected to common law 
offence or statutory offences. The content of those offences also varies greatly 
from state-to-state. 
  
1 Application 
Criminal law will apply to all individual persons with little restriction. In the 
context of maritime disasters, this is likely to have encouraged prosecuting bodies 
to scapegoat the master as an individual person. Gold further explains that 
‘scapegoating’ the master often allows other members of the safety chain to avoid 
criminal liability completely. He says: 
 
24 
 
In many accidents the first line of defence is to find someone to blame, a scapegoat, 
usually situated lower on the operational or management ladder. Yet as almost all 
accidents show, it is not usually single individuals who are to blame for what has 
occurred, but a combination of omission, commission or error, that lies much deeper 
within the system, outlook, philosophy, attitude and involvement of the whole 
organization.’82 
 
State criminal law does not provide an effective avenue for prosecuting the whole 
organisation responsible for a maritime disaster. The provisions under the 
Commonwealth system apply only to Commonwealth offence, which does not 
include murder or manslaughter. Gobert and Punch explain:  
 
‘[The] criminal law was not developed with companies in mind. Concepts such as mens 
rea and actus reus, which make perfectly good sense when applied to individuals, do not 
translate easily to an inanimate fictional entity such as a corporation. Trying to apply 
these concepts to companies is a bit like trying to squeeze a square peg into a round 
hole.
83
 
 
A prosecuting body intended to charge a company for manslaughter, they may 
prosecute the responsible individual within that company. This was the situation 
in the New South Wales District Court case of Cittadini.
84
 The case concerned the 
death of four crew members working on a yacht. After investigation, it was found 
that the keel of the yacht has been cut and re-welded during the construction of 
the vessel. The manufacturer was convicted of negligent manslaughter for failure 
to properly supervise those in his employ during the vessel’s construction. The 
Supreme Court of Criminal Appeal allowed an appeal from the manufacturer on 
the ground that the verdict of the jury was ‘unreasonable’.85 
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The Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) is the only state criminal law provision particular to 
the death of an employee.
86
 However, the ACT is the only state without an 
adjacent area for the purposes of the Cooperative Scheme. The industrial 
manslaughter offence will only apply in a maritime context to Australian vessels 
operating outside of the adjacent area. 
 
2 Criminalised Conduct 
The most relevant offences in each state jurisdiction are murder and 
manslaughter. As previously mentioned, these two offences share ‘causing death’ 
as the common physical element, and it is the determination of particular fault 
elements that will establish the particular charge. The fault elements required by 
each offence vary from state-to-state. In New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia and Tasmania, recklessness will be sufficient to establish murder.
87
 In 
the Northern Territory, recklessness is specifically an element of manslaughter.
88
 
In Western Australia and Queensland, conduct which is reckless should be argued 
as being negligent (or by way of an intentional act) in order to incur a charge of 
manslaughter.
89
 To have the same conduct criminalised to different extents across 
jurisdictions presents a very confusing situation to seafarers who are travelling 
around the coasts of Australia, or even only through two different adjacent areas. 
 
There are several criminal offences other than murder and manslaughter that may 
be relevant to a maritime disaster causing death. These offences vary from state-
to-state. There is confusion, however, as to which of these offences can and 
should be used when charging with a maritime disaster causing death. Any state 
law that relates to marine safety will be excluded by the National Law, unless the 
law is prescribed by the regulations.
90
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Figure 3. Other relevant offences by state. 
State (or territory) Relevant offence(s) 
Queensland Dangerous operation of a vehicle* 
(Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 328A) 
New South Wales Dangerous navigation* 
(Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 52B)  
Reckless, dangerous or negligent navigation and 
other acts 
(Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW) s 13) 
South Australia Causing death or harm by use of vehicle or vessel* 
(Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19A) 
Tasmania Endangering life on a ship 
(Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 180(2)) 
Breach of duty as a seaman 
(Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 180(3)) 
Victoria Culpable driving causing death* 
(Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 318)  
Dangerous driving causing death or serious injury* 
(Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 319) 
Dangerous operation of a recreational vessel, 
government vessel or hire and drive vessel 
(Marine Safety Act 2010 (Vic) s 87) 
Acts tending to endanger vessel or crew 
(Marine Safety Act 2010 (Vic) s 88) 
Western Australia Culpable driving (not of motor vehicle) causing 
death or grievous bodily harm* 
(Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) s 284) 
* Specifically not excluded by the National Law.
91
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3 Penalties 
The maximum penalty for both murder and manslaughter is the same in most 
states; life imprisonment. The distinction between the two offences is merely for 
the purposes of classification. Regarding the other relevant offences in each state, 
the penalties vary widely. In cases of maritime disasters, a number of factors 
would be taken into account for sentencing, including number of deaths, level of 
responsibility and level of negligence or recklessness. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The Cooperative Scheme was introduced ‘in order to achieve a consistent 
jurisdictional approach to the application of offences at sea.’92 Though it may be 
more consistent than the previous system, the Cooperative Scheme does not apply 
one consistent law to all maritime disasters causing death. This would not be 
problematic if the laws applicable to maritime disasters were similar across the 
states; however, the state criminal law (and additional regulatory crimes) are 
highly variable. A vessel that is passing the coast of several Australian states 
when it suffers a disaster may face distinctly different offences every time that it 
crosses an invisible maritime border. 
 
B Navigation Act 
The Navigation Act 2012 (Cth) (the ‘Navigation Act’) has been described as the 
‘foundation for the regulation of Australian ships and shipping’.93 The Navigation 
Act came into effect on 1 July 2013, superseding the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) 
(the ‘Navigation Act 1912’). The 2012 version was introduced into Australian 
parliament alongside several other pieces of legislation which, together, 
represented some of the largest maritime reforms in Australia’s history.  
 
1 Application 
The Navigation Act applies to vessels which often leave Australian waters. These 
vessels may be either a Foreign Vessel (‘FV’) or a Regulated Australian Vessel 
                                                 
92
 Mary Wood, Derran Moss and Barton Hoyle, ‘Australian Legislation Concerning 
Matters of International Law 2000’ (2000) Australian Year Book of International Law 20, 
20. 
93
 Michael White, Australian Maritime Law (Federation Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2014) 342. 
28 
 
(‘RAV’). It also applies to Domestic Commercial Vessels (‘DCVs’) and 
Recreational Vessel (‘RVs’). Each criminal offence in the Navigation Act 
specifies the types of vessels to which that offence applies. The Navigation Act 
does not apply to naval vessels
94
 and certain Australian Border Force vessels.
95
 
 
The Navigation Act will apply to FVs in two instances: 
(a) When the FV has Australian Nationality, despite being registered in 
another country; or 
(b) When the FV is operating in Australian waters.96 
 
‘Australian nationality’ is defined as having the meaning given in the Ship 
Registration Act 1981 (Cth). The definition includes an Australian-registered ship, 
an unregistered Australian-owned ship, an unregistered ship wholly owned by 
residents of Australia, or a ship solely-operated by residents of Australia.
97
  
 
An FV will be operating in Australian waters if the vessel is:
98
 
a) In an Australian port; or 
b) Entering or leaving an Australian port; or 
c) In the internal waters of Australia; or 
d) In the territorial sea of Australia, other than in the course of innocent passage. 
 
An RAV is defined as a non-recreational vessel that is registered under the Ship 
Registration Act 1981 (Cth) and, one or more of the following:  
(i) the vessel is proceeding on an overseas voyage or is for use on an overseas 
voyage; 
(ii) a certificate issued under [the Navigation Act]…is in force for the vessel; 
(iii) an opt-in declaration is in force for the vessel. 
 
The opt-in declaration is done by way of application to AMSA.
99
 Upon an 
application being successful, the vessel will become subject to a wider range of 
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criminal liability under the Navigation Act. AMSA also has the power to declare 
that a vessel is not an RAV.
100
 According to the Q&A, AMSA may declare that 
the vessel is to be subject to the National Law instead,
101
 but this would only be in 
the case that the vessel in question is a domestic commercial vessel as per the 
definition in the National Law.
102
 
 
A DCV under the Navigation Act has the same definition as under the National 
Law.
103
 It is ‘a vessel that is for use in connection with a commercial, 
governmental or research activity.’104 The commercial vessels within this 
definition are considered to be ‘domestic’ if they operate solely within the EEZ.105 
 
2 Criminalised Conduct 
There are three major charges under the Navigation Act relevant to causing death 
through maritime disaster: collision, unseaworthiness, and unsafe loading. 
 
(a) Collision 
The Navigation Act gives effect to the Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
106
 The charge of ‘operating a vessel 
in contravention of the regulations’ is applicable to all vessels regulated under the 
Navigation Act.
107
 The two offences criminalise conduct of the ‘owner’ and 
master of the vessel respectively.  
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For the purposes of the Navigation Act, an owner is defined as one or more of the 
following:
108
 
(a) A person who has a legal or beneficial interest in the vessel other than as a mortgagee;  
(b) A person with overall general control and management of the vessel; 
(c) A person who has assumed responsibility for the vessel from a person referred to in 
paragraph (a) or (b). 
 
This definition is very broad. White has said: 
The wide definition of owner may mean that some, or even all, of the beneficial owner, the legal 
owner, registered owner, charterer by demise or otherwise, sub-charterer, master, pilot and 
operator may be exposed to this duty.
109
 
 
Further, it is unclear as to whether ‘ownership’ shifts from each party as control 
shifts, or whether all parties that may be considered the ‘owner’ of the vessel hold 
responsibility for collision concurrently. As the offence provisions use the definite 
article ‘the’ to describe the owner, it could be argued that be assumed that 
ownership shifts depending on who has general control and management of the 
vessel at the time of the offence being committed. The definition also says that the 
master or pilot of the vessel is not taken to have general control and management 
of the vessel merely by virtue of being the master or pilot.
110
 
 
(b) Seaworthiness 
Seaworthiness is a common concept in shipping law. It exists as an implied term 
in contracts of carriage
111
 and as an express obligation under the Hague-Visby 
Rules.
112
 A shipowner owes a duty to ensure that their vessel is seaworthy at the 
commencement of any voyage. A breach of a civil seaworthiness obligation may 
bring civil actions against the shipowner or the charterer of the vessel. 
 
The Navigation Act criminalises unseaworthiness. The obligation is held by the 
owner and the master, separately. Under the Navigation Act: 
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A vessel is seaworthy if, and only if: 
(a) It is in a fit state as to the condition of hull and equipment, boilers (if any) and 
machinery, the stowage of ballast or cargo, the number and qualifications of 
seafarers, and in every other respect to: 
(i) Encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage undertaken; and 
(ii) Not pose a threat to the environment; and 
(b) It is not overloaded; and 
(c) The living and working conditions on board the vessel do not pose a threat to the 
health, safety or welfare of the vessel’s seafarers.113 
 
The offence of ‘taking [an] unseaworthy vessel to sea’ provides for a ‘fault-based’ 
penalty, but does not specific the specific fault required.
114
 According to the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth):  
If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that 
consists only of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element for that 
physical element.
115
 
It can be argued that unseaworthiness is a ‘circumstance’ to which an owner or a 
master may be reckless. This is the same fault element which was provided in the 
1912 Navigation Act.
116
 
 
In a civil context, a carrier need only exercise ‘due diligence to…make the ship 
seaworthy’.117 Under the Navigation Act, the obligation appears to be absolute. 
Under the 1912 Navigation Act, the obligation was also absolute; however, it was 
a defence to a charge of unseaworthiness to have ‘used all reasonable means to 
ensure the seaworthiness of the ship’.118  There was also allowance made for 
unseaworthy vessels put to sea in ‘special circumstances’ which made the putting 
of the vessel to sea ‘reasonable and justifiable’.119 Neither the defence, nor the 
special circumstances, exist in the Navigation Act. This seaworthiness obligation 
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places an unfair standard on the owner and master of a vessel, which far exceeds 
the obligations placed on parties under the civil law.  
 
According to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (‘AMSA’), there are 
several issues that will be taken into account before AMSA will prosecute an 
offence under the Navigation Act.
120
 They include: 
 Does the breach exhibit a significant degree of criminality or disregard? 
 Is the breach sufficiently serious that the Commonwealth and the 
community would expect it to be dealt with by prosecution? 
 Is it important to deter similar behaviour? 
 
It appears that the considerations required of AMSA before a prosecution is made 
are actually issues that should have been considered by the lawmakers when 
formulating appropriate offences, or by the judiciary in a case concerning an 
offence under the Navigation Act. Such a large amount of discretion on the part of 
a statutory authority may mean that there is a large degree of variance in the 
prosecuted parties.  
 
Strangely, the seaworthiness obligation under the Navigation Act is only 
applicable to RAVs and FVs.
121
 In other words, criminal sanctions for 
unseaworthiness will only apply to vessels which regularly leave Australian 
waters. There is no criminal liability for DCVs or RVs, nor is seaworthiness 
covered in the National Law, which is applicable to domestic vessels specifically.  
 
Further, the obligation of seaworthiness for RAVs and FVs only falls on the 
‘owner’ and the master. When reviewing the 1912 Navigation Act, the report said 
that: 
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‘Ship and company management should be liable for fines or imprisonment where a ship 
is unseaworthy or loss of life or serious personal injury are a direct consequence of 
management failing to take responsibility for safety.’122 
 
These provisions, though new, show various inconsistencies and other problems. 
The provisions in the Navigation Act demonstrate this when the only 
‘management’ which may be liable for the unseaworthiness is the ‘owner’. 
Though that definition may be broad, it is unlikely to be broad enough to 
encompass the manufacturer of the vessel.  
 
3 Overall Issues 
(a) The chain of responsibility 
Offences under the Navigation Act do not appreciate the ‘safety chain’ concept. 
Though it has been noted that the word ‘owner’ may be incredibly vague when 
used in the offence provisions, it is unlikely to be vague enough to include the 
manufacturer of the vessel, or maintenance personnel. Both of these parties may 
be responsible for causing a vessel to be unseaworthy or, at the very least, causing 
an increased number of deaths.
123
 It is arguable, then, that the Navigation Act is 
not broad enough to be considered fit for its purpose to criminalise liability on a 
regulated Australian Vessel. 
 
(b) The criminalised conduct 
Under the Navigation Act, there are no offences relating to generally negligent or 
reckless conduct. Though the Navigation Act covers criminal liability of masters 
and shipowners for unseaworthiness and collision, it does not cover any other 
situations in which death is likely to occur. If a vessel is merely grounded due to 
negligent or reckless navigation, the Navigation Act does not assist in attributing 
criminal liability. Prosecuting bodies may then choose to utilise state law in order 
to fill the gaps. This means that state criminal law will be the only applicable law 
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to FVs and RAVs, which fall victim to a maritime disaster due to negligent or 
reckless navigation. 
 
(c) Penalties 
The penalties under the Navigation Act are relatively low, when compared with 
the penalties under state criminal law for murder or manslaughter. All of the 
relevant offences provide for a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment or 
600 penalty units, or both.
124
 It is likely, then, that charges of unseaworthiness or 
collision are intended to supplement the state criminal law offences, rather than to 
substitute for them. 
 
4 Conclusion 
In summary, the Navigation Act is fit for its intended purpose in some respects. If 
the seaworthiness obligation were to be extended to DCVs and RVs, under the 
Navigation Act or the National Law, it would strengthen the consistency of the 
criminal law. Further, if the seaworthiness obligation were to be extended to other 
parties within the safety chain (particularly the manufacturer), it would allow a 
prosecuting body more options for punishment of an offence. 
 
C National Law (current) 
During the Second Reading speech for the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial 
Vessel) National Law Bill 2012, the Hon. Anthony Albanese explained that the 
benefit of the National Law would produce one unified system to deal with the 
marine safety of all domestic commercial vessels.
125
 In line with that, one of the 
stated objects of the National Law is to ‘[provide] a single national framework for 
ensuring the safe operation, design, construction and equipping of domestic 
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commercial vessels’.126 The National Law is now part of the criminal law of 
almost all states and it applies with force of the CSA.
127
  
 
1 Application 
As previously mentioned, a DCV is defined as being ‘a vessel that is for use in 
connection with a commercial, governmental or research activity.
128
 White 
describes the scope of the National Law as being ‘an uncomfortable combination 
of vessels involved in three quite different functions.’129 The National Law 
specifically does not apply to RAVs, FVs, defence vessels and vessels owned by a 
school.
130
 RAVs and foreign vessels, in particular, are subject to liability under 
the Navigation Act as their operations are not domestic in nature. 
 
Criminal liability under the National Law is split into six sections. The sections 
are split by parties, in order to specify their individual liability. The parties dealt 
with are: 
a) Owners131 
b) ‘Designers, builders, manufacturers etc.’132 
c) Masters133 
d) Crew134 
e) Passengers135 
f) Others136 
                                                 
126
 National Law s 3. 
127
  Except for Western Australia (and the Australian Capital Territory). It appears from 
the website of the Western Australian Department of Transport that the state government 
believes that the regulation of domestic commercial is the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth government. See Department of Transport (WA), National Reform of 
Shipping Regulations (14 October 2015) <www.transport.wa.gov.au/imarine/national-
reform-of-shipping-regulations.asp>. 
128
 National Law s 7(1). 
129
 Michael White, Australian Maritime Law (Federation Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2014) 368. 
130
 National Law s 7(3). 
131
 National Law ss 12-13. 
132
 National Law ss 14-15. 
133
 National Law ss 16-18. 
134
 National Law ss 19-20. 
135
 National Law ss 21-22. 
36 
 
The definition of ‘owner’ under the National Law is almost identical to that under 
Navigation Act and brings with it the same uncertainties. The parties captured by 
the section applying to ‘designers, builders, manufacturers etc’ are also very 
broad. It includes:
137
 
‘A person who designs, commissions, constructs, manufacturers, supplies, maintains, 
repairs or modifies a domestic commercial vessel, or marine equipment that relates to 
such a vessel’. 
 
By providing offences that apply to the above listed parties, the National Law is 
much broader than the Navigation Act, which makes the National Law more 
effective in achieving the purpose of criminal law to apply to any parties 
responsible for damage. There is no limitation in the National Law as to whether 
one of the listed parties needs to be Australian in order to incur the applicable 
penalty. The National Law purports to apply extra-territorially,
138
 which means 
that an Australian prosecuting body may attempt to enforce the obligations of 
‘designers, builders, manufacturers etc’ to foreign parties residing in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
The definition of the term ‘master’ is also broad. The National Law defines the 
master of a vessel as ‘the person who has command or charge of the vessel, but 
does not include a pilot.’139 This definition could potentially include any member 
of the crew who is exercising the role of the master at some point during the 
voyage. In New Zealand, under similar legislation, a first mate was considered 
liable for criminal provisions intended to apply to a master because he ‘had 
command or charge of the vessel’ at the time of an incident occurring.140 As a 
result of being considered to be the master at that time, the accused was required 
to comply with the reporting requirements that would ordinarily apply to masters. 
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2 Criminalised Conduct  
In the context of a maritime incident causing death, there are several provisions 
under the National Law which may be used to impose criminal liability. The focus 
of the National Law was always intended to be on its deterrent effect rather than 
punishments it imposed on those liable for breaches. The Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Act states that ‘the overall objective of the penalties in the 
Bill is to increase compliance with the National Law and decrease the resort to 
prosecution to achieve that aim.’141  
 
The provisions in the National Law do not actually punish individuals for causing 
death. Instead, they punish an individual for failing to ensure safety on board the 
vessel. As example of the obligations under the National Law is as follows:
142
 
 
(1) An owner of a domestic commercial vessel must, so far as reasonably practical, 
ensure the safety of: 
(a) The vessel; and 
(b) Marine safety equipment that relates to the vessel; and 
(c) The operation of the vessel. 
 
Though ‘ensure’ is not defined within the National Law, the word was discussed 
in the case of Cittadini. McClellan CJ at CL said that it was important not to 
import absolute liability onto a person with the obligation to ‘ensure’.143 An 
absolute liability offence is defined as an offence without the need to prove a fault 
element or the ability to argue a defence.
144
 In each of the sections attributing 
criminal liability, the conduct required of the respective parties is to ensure safety 
‘so far as reasonably practical’. There are several issues to be taken into account 
when assessing what was reasonably practical. The most simple defence to argue 
in regard to unsafe conduct, is to argue that the accused person did all that was 
‘reasonably able to be done’ when ‘taking into account and weighing up all 
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relevant matters’.145 The relevant matters listed include likelihood of the risk, 
degree of harm, and the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or 
minimise the risk. According to the government, courts should consider the 
degree of control one party has to ensure safety, as opposed to other parties, when 
deciding what is reasonably practical under the National Law.
146
 
 
Each offence provides for three corresponding fault elements.
147
 The fault element 
that is established will determine the applicable penalty. They are: 
a) The person intends the act or omission to be a risk to the safety of a 
person or the domestic commercial vessel concerned; or 
b) The person is reckless as to whether the act or omission is a risk to the 
safety of a person or the domestic commercial vessel concerned; or 
c) The person is negligent as to whether the act or omission is a risk to 
the safety of a person or the domestic commercial vessel concerned. 
 
In the case of a maritime disaster, it is unlikely that a person is going to cause the 
disaster intentionally (and therefore they did not intend a risk), so the two most 
relevant fault elements are recklessness and negligence. Each offence provides for 
a strict liability offence, if the conduct of the accused person did not ensure the 
safety of the vessel and its operation, but there is no fault element established. 
 
3 Overall Issues 
(a) Excluding Other Offences 
The National Law applies to the exclusion of any state and territory laws that 
relate to marine safety ‘so far as [they] would otherwise apply in relation to 
domestic commercial vessels’.148 This provision appears to be a direct attempt to 
oust the applicability of the criminal offences provided in the Marine Safety Act 
2012 (Vic) and the Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW). There are exceptions to the 
ousting provision provided in the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) 
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National Law Regulation 2013, but the New South Wales and Victorian acts are 
not listed there.
149
  
 
(b) Penalties 
The fines imposed for each relevant offence under the National Law range from 
200 to 120 penalty units. Though the offences under the National Law are not 
specifically applicable to causing death, the offence of ‘failure to ensure safety’ 
may be the only criminal liability that is enforceable against a manufacturer. 
Therefore, it would be beneficial for the penalties under the National Law to be 
increased to allow for effective prosecution of a manufacturer if the prosecuting 
body deem it appropriate. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The National Law is very broad in the conduct that it criminalises, and it is very 
broad in the parties to which it potentially applies. These features give a 
prosecuting body a large degree of flexibility when considering a prosecution. 
That flexibility may equate to uncertainty on the part of any member of the safety 
chain who is seeking to avoid criminal charges. This flexibility, however, would 
be mitigated by the broad defence. It may satisfy the purposes of broad 
applicability, but there is a serious question as to whether the penalties under the 
National Law would deter offending in any way. 
 
D National Law (Future) 
Whilst the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Bill 2012 
(Cth) was passing through parliament, the government consulted with maritime 
stakeholders across the country for opinions on the criminal liability provisions.
150
 
The consulted groups expressed their support for the offence provisions to be 
brought into lines with the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) (the ‘WHS 
Act’), which does not apply to vessels. The parliament then passed the Marine 
Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law (Consequential Amendments) 
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Act 2012 (Cth) in order to alter the offence provisions in the National Law. The 
amendments are due to come into effect once all states have brought their own 
versions of the WHS Act into force.
151
 The two major changes to the offence 
provisions of the National Law are in the conduct which is criminalised and the 
maximum penalties. 
 
1 Criminalised conduct 
Under the amended legislation, liability will only fall on those who have been 
reckless (and in situations where strict liability is appropriate). The amendment 
also introduces a type of offending that is still failure to ensure safety, but does 
not require any risk of death or serious injury or illness. Pursuant to the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth), the fault element of recklessness will also be established by 
intention.
152
 This means that, effectively, the only fault element which has been 
removed from the applicable sections is negligence. Any conduct that would fall 
under negligence in the current version of the Act will likely need to be charged 
under the strict liability section in the new one. 
 
2 Penalties 
The amended penalties correspond with the penalties under the WHS Act and 
dramatically increases the penalties for each type of offending under the National 
Law. The amendment effects the sections pertaining to owners, masters, 
manufacturers etc., and crew. The amended penalties for recklessness are: 
(a) If the offence is committed by an individual (other than as a person conducting a 
business or undertaking or as an officer of a person conducting a business or 
undertaking) - $300,000 or 5 years imprisonment or both; or 
(b) If the offence is committed by an individual as a person conducting business or 
undertaking or as an officer of a person conducting a business or undertaking - 
$600,000 or 5 years imprisonment, or both; or 
(c) If the offence is committed by a body corporate - $3,000,000.
153
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The strict liability version of the offence provides: 
(a) If the offence is committed by an individual (other than as a person conducting a 
business or undertaking or as an officer of a person conducting a business or 
undertaking) - $150,000; or 
(b) If the offence is committed by an individual as a person conducting business or 
undertaking or as an officer of a person conducting a business or undertaking - 
$300,000; or 
(c) If the offence is committed by a body corporate – $1,500,000.
154
 
 
Though it is intended to be a strict liability provision, it is assumed that conduct 
that does not meet the fault element requirement of recklessness will be included. 
This means that, though there is no specific section for negligence as fault 
element, it appears that negligent conduct will be sufficient to establish the strict 
liability offence. 
 
Figure 4. Financial penalties by conduct, before and after amendments. 
Conduct National Law (current) National Law (future) 
Recklessness 200 penalty units $300,000 - $3,000,000 
Negligence 120 penalty units N/A  
Strict liability 60 penalty units $150,000 – $1,500,000 
 
3 Conclusion 
These changes restrict the type of conduct which is criminalised, but does increase 
the sanctions for the remaining types. The purpose of the law, then, is both 
weakened and strengthened simultaneously. However, if consistency in the law is 
one of the overarching principles of maritime law as it applies to seafarers, then 
bringing the scheme into line with the WHS scheme can only be a good thing. 
 
E Other Commonwealth Statute Law 
The statutes discussed above do not represent an exhaustive list of the law 
applicable to individuals in the maritime industry who have caused the death. 
There are, at least, two other potentially relevant Commonwealth statutes. 
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1 Causing the Death of an Australian 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sets out Commonwealth criminal offences, 
with no apparent restriction on the parties to which it applies.
155
Section 115.2 of 
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) makes it an offence to cause the death of an 
Australian. The offence was intended to apply to those working within terrorist 
organisations who caused the death of Australians by orchestrating terrorist 
acts.
156
 It seems unlikely that a crime against the Criminal Code could be charged, 
though. It is unlikely that this section of the Criminal Code was intended to apply 
on board a ship.
157
  
 
2 Causing Death at Sea 
Under the Crimes (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act 1992 it is an offence to cause 
death on a ship ‘in connection with the commission or attempted commission of 
an offence against [specified sections of the act]’. 158 Those specified sections 
relate to the following conduct: 
 Seizing a ship; 
 Acts of violence; 
 Destroying or damaging a ship; 
 Placing destructive devices on a ship; 
 Destroying or damaging navigational facilities; or 
 Giving false information. 
 
In the case of a maritime disaster, it is possible that an individual may be charged 
with causing death in connection with destroying or damaging a ship. The 
maximum penalty for such an offence is life imprisonment, which is the most 
serious of all penalties under the relevant Commonwealth regulatory crimes. 
However, it appears that negligence or recklessness will not be sufficient to 
establish an offence under the Crimes (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act 1992 
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(Cth). As there is no fault element specified in the offence, the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) will import ‘intention’ as the fault element. This is unlikely to be 
established by the circumstances of a maritime disaster. 
 
G Conclusion 
There appear to be several complexities and unanswered questions regarding the 
laws applicable to death caused by maritime disaster.  Overall, it appears that 
several of the individual offences are not fit for their intended purpose. Of 
particular concern is the Navigation Act, due to its seaworthiness obligation and 
its lack of offences for negligent or reckless navigation. Not only is the 
seaworthiness obligation limited to RAVs and FVs, and only the owners and the 
masters of those vessels, but it appears to render an accused person indefensible 
once charged. Further, as there are no general provisions under the Navigation Act 
for failure to ensure safety (as there are under the National Law), a prosecuting 
body will need to choose between a charge of unseaworthiness and a charge under 
the applicable state criminal law. 
 
Figure 5. Liability by type of vessel. 
DCV Foreign vessel RAV 
Collision Unseaworthiness Unseaworthiness 
National Law (current) Collision Collision 
National Law (future) Murder Murder 
Murder Manslaughter Manslaughter 
Manslaughter 
 
Figure 6. Liability by party.  
Shipowner Master Manufacturer 
Unseaworthiness Unseaworthiness National Law (current) 
Collision Collision National Law (future) 
National Law (current) National Law (current) Murder 
National Law (future) National Law (future) Manslaughter 
Murder Murder 
Manslaughter Manslaughter 
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V CASE STUDIES 
Though Australia has been very fortunate not to have suffered from any large-
scale maritime disasters requiring criminal prosecution, it may not be so fortunate 
in future. As ‘it usually takes a disaster to focus the attention of maritime policy-
makers’, this chapter attempts to apply Australian laws to several fictional 
scenarios in order to appreciate the complexities of the application and use of each 
law.
159
 It may be useful to lawmakers to attempt to apply the applicable 
Australian law to hypothetical situation such as those which the world has already 
seen.  This chapter will analyse notable recent maritime disasters which involved 
death. The analysis will take the factual scenarios of these notable cases and ask 
what would have happened by way of criminal prosecution if the events had 
instead occurred within Australian waters. The focus of this chapter is less on 
whether an Australian prosecuting body would prosecute, but more on whether 
they could. The Australian law will be fit for purpose if it has the ability to impose 
liability on the party (or parties) responsible for the damage to the victim (or 
victims). Issues of enforcement against a foreign party and other decisions 
affecting the choice to prosecute will not be discussed at length. The factual 
situations that will be analysed are based on the Costa Concordia, the Lamma IV, 
the Sewol, and the Princess Ashika. 
 
It is often difficult to secure the official reports for a maritime disaster occurring 
in another jurisdiction as they may only be prepared for and presented to a court. 
Much of the information in this chapter has come from news reports. However, as 
the purpose of this chapter is to pose hypothetical situations, the accuracy of the 
accusations made in the news article is not of paramount importance. 
 
A Determining Liability in General 
When authorities are considering the prosecution of those responsible for a 
maritime disaster, it may be useful to consider liability for particular offences as it 
applies to different vessels, different parties, and different conduct. Below are 
several ways to consider these factors when mounting a prosecution: 
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Figure 7. Determination of Liability. 
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B The Costa Concordia Disaster 
Scenario Four. An Australian cruise ship leaving an Australian port navigates 
very close to an island. The vessel makes contact with some rocks surrounding the 
island, which causes a large breach of the hull. The vessel floods. The master 
does not call for an evacuation as he is waiting for the emergency generator 
system to start. The system does not start. Several people die. 
 
This situation is based on the facts of the Costa Concordia disaster in Italian 
waters in January 2012. The master of the vessel, Captain Francesco Schettino, 
has since been convicted under Italian law for ‘multiple manslaughter’, causing a 
shipwreck and abandoning a ship.
160
 The consumer group Codacons, who is 
pursuing a class action suit against the owners of the Cost Concordia say that 
‘Schettino should be punished but he has been made a scapegoat.’161 The group 
has said that it was ‘unacceptable and unbelievable’ that the prosecutors were not 
pursuing other parties for ‘serious malfunctions of the ship’.162 There even seems 
to be questions about whether the master of the vessel actually made the decision 
to veer close to the rocks.
163
 The purpose of this chapter is not to determine the 
responsible parties. It is instead the purpose of this chapter to consider whether 
Australian law provides for other parties that arguably contributed to the Costa 
Concordia disaster to be appropriately charged. 
 
The itinerary of the Costa Concordia shows that it planned to visit several ports in 
the Mediterranean, after leaving Italy.
164
 If a similar vessel was planning to leave 
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an Australian port to operate a cruise between other countries in Australasia, it is 
likely that that vessel would be classified by AMSA as a regulated Australian 
vessel. As discussed previously, this is because the vessel would be regularly 
leaving the Australian EEZ. With this classification for the purposes of Australian 
law, the Australian version of the Costa Concordia would be regulated by the 
Navigation Act. Further, as the Italian Costa Concordia grounded within Italian 
territorial waters on the western coast of the country, it is assumed that the 
hypothetical Australian vessel grounded within Western Australian territorial 
waters. 
 
Figure 8. Costa Concordia Route.
165
 
 
 
As there is no evidence to suggest instances of either unsafe loading or collision, 
the only possible criminal cause of action under the Navigation Act is for 
unseaworthiness. As mentioned above, a charge of unseaworthiness may be laid 
on the owner or master of a vessel if the vessel is not ‘in a fit state as to the 
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condition of…equipment [or] qualifications of seafarers’.166 According to the 
government investigation report, the equipment on board the vessel was compliant 
with all required standards at the time of its departure from port.
167
 Further, 
though it was the actions of the master that were found to be the cause of the 
disaster,
168
 there has been no question raised as to his formal qualifications. Given 
these findings, it is unlikely that an Australian prosecuting body would consider 
unseaworthiness to be an appropriate charge against the owner or master of the 
Costa Concordia. 
 
It was reported that the vessel suffered from ‘faulty water-tight compartment 
doors, blocked lifts and the failure of emergency power supplies’169 and that these 
are issues that may have caused lives to be lost. Unless this goes further to 
establishing a charge of unseaworthiness against the owner or master, this 
evidence could only go towards a charge against the manufacturer of the vessel. 
Under Australian law, however, the only charge that can be laid specifically 
against the manufacturer is under the National Law. This act will not apply to 
regulated Australian vessels such as a cruise ship which leaves the EEZ regularly.   
 
If the offences provided under the Navigation Act are not relevant to a situation 
involving a regulated Australian vessel, the following step is to consider the 
applicable law of the relevant state or territory, pursuant to the CSA. In this case, 
the relevant criminal law would come from the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) 
(the ‘WA Code’).  
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The relevant offences under the WA Code are murder
170
 and manslaughter.
171
 The 
fault elements for a charge of murder are only a) intent to kill and b) intent to do a 
bodily injury. In the case of the Costa Concordia, it appears that the fault element 
was recklessness, which will not be sufficient to constitute murder under the WA 
Code. It would, however, be sufficient to constitute murder in New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. Subject to the law of Western Australia, 
it appears that the master of the Costa Concordia would be charged with multiple 
counts of manslaughter. 
 
C Lamma IV Collision 
Scenario Five. Two ferries collide off the coast of the Northern Territory. Both 
vessels are domestic commercial vessels. Both vessels sink and several crew 
members die. The masters of each vessel survive.  
 
The facts for this scenario are similar to the Sea Smooth/Lamma IV collision in 
Hong Kong’s territorial waters in 2012. In that disaster, 39 people died as a result 
of a collision, which has been described as ‘Hong Kong’s deadliest marine 
tragedy of recent times’.172 Captain Lai Sai-Ming of the Sea Smooth was found 
guilty of causing the collision. 
 
As the collision is the most obvious cause of death, a prosecuting body is most 
likely to consider the relevant criminal charge under the Navigation Act. The 
relevant charges apply to all vessels operating under its jurisdiction, which means 
that a DCV such as the Sea Smooth could be prosecuted. As this charge may 
apply to both the owner and the master of the vessel, an investigation report 
would be required to determine which party, if either, was responsible for the 
collision. The reports of the Lamma IV collision suggest that the Sea Smooth 
vessel was responsible for the initial collision, due to the poor navigation of the 
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master. Therefore, in the Australian version of the Lamma IV disaster, the 
responsible party would be effectively charged. The Australian law appears to be 
fit for its intended purpose in this scenario. The parties responsible would be 
‘caught’ by the applicable criminal law. 
 
One report of the Lamma IV disaster described the collision as ‘relatively minor’, 
but did explain that there were several manufacturing issues that may have caused 
the vessel to sink particularly quickly and, therefore, claim more lives that the 
initial collision.
173
 In this case, an Australian prosecuting body may wish to 
consider appropriate criminal charges against the manufacturer of the vessel (or 
another party responsible for the vessel, which is not the master or owner). 
Though the prosecutors would be unable to do so under the Navigation Act, the 
National Law does provide for appropriate charges against the manufacturer. At 
present, the penalties for applicable conduct are very low; however, if the incident 
occurred after the new changes are made to the National Law, then the 
manufacturer of the vessel may face up to five years imprisonment. 
 
If the prosecuting body chooses not to charge in the ways discussed, they may 
resort to charging the master under Northern Territory criminal law for 
manslaughter. A charge of manslaughter against the master may be relatively 
simple to establish. If, however, the vessel were in the adjacent area of New South 
Wales, the master’s recklessness in causing the collision with the Lamma IV may 
be used to establish a charge of murder. This demonstrates the variability of the 
laws from state-to-state. 
 
A charge of manslaughter against the manufacturer may be difficult to prove due 
to the element of causation. There is no Northern Territory regulatory crimes that 
apply to maritime disasters causing death. Therefore, the prosecuting body is 
more likely to gain a successful prosecution of the manufacturer under the 
National Law. 
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D The  Sewol Disaster 
Scenario Six. An Australian ferry departs a port in Queensland and is destined for 
a port in New South Wales. After entering the waters adjacent to New South 
Wales, the vessel capsizes and sinks. Several people die. The master survives. 
 
The Sewol ferry departed Incheon port on 15 April 2014. The next day, the vessel 
capsized and sank. Over 300 lives were lost, many of whom were school children. 
The master of the vessel, Lee Joon-Seok, and the chief engineer survived the 
disaster. They were arrested by South Korean authorities shortly after being 
rescued. The prima facie cause of the capsizing was the failure of the vessel’s 
third mate to navigate safety through particularly treacherous waters. However, it 
seems that the seaworthiness of the vessel had been called into question prior to 
the incident.
174
 The lawyer for the chief engineer said that ‘[t]he defendants must 
be punished properly ... but I hope there will also be stern punishment for the 
company which turned the Sewol into a timebomb.’175 Nautilus International were 
particularly concerned about the lack of support that was shown by the 
international maritime community for the Sewol seafarers.
176
Investigations into 
the vessel suggests that the ferry was overloaded and that the crew not trained for 
emergency evacuations. Evidence has also emerged that suggests that there were 
faulty modifications made to the vessel made prior to its departure.
177
 
 
If the Sewol ferry was an Australian vessel it is likely to have been a domestic 
commercial vessel, as it operated for commercial purposes and was not intending 
to leave the EEZ of its country of origin. With this classification, the Australian 
version of the Sewol ferry would have been governed by the National Law and its 
provisions on negligence and recklessness. 
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Despite the fact that the seaworthiness of the Sewol vessel was called into 
question, there would be no provision in the National Law to prosecute for that 
unseaworthiness. If the vessel were regulated under the Navigation Act, the 
prosecuting body would have had that option. Instead, the prosecutors may charge 
under the National Law (and, therefore, attempt to fine the responsible parties) or 
to charge under the relevant state or territory criminal law. It is possible for the 
captain of the Australian Sewol to be charged with reckless navigation under the 
Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), which may attribute a penalty of up to two years 
imprisonment;
178
 however, this offence is likely to have been excluded by the 
National Law, which would attribute a penalty of up to $36,000 for this conduct. 
 
Figure 9. Sewol Route.
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E The Princess Ashika Disaster 
Scenario Seven. An Australian ferry is travelling from Victoria to Tasmania. The 
vessel has previously been classified ‘unseaworthy’, but has since been given 
written permission from the government to resume service. During the voyage, the 
vessel begins taking on water. The vessel eventually capsizes and sinks. Several 
people die. 
 
In August 2009, a Tongan inter-island ferry capsized and sank, causing the deaths 
of 74 people. After investigation, it was concluded that the vessel began taking 
water into the cargo hold below deck and that this set the deadly events into 
motion.
180
 Though there was no specific reason found for the water to have 
penetrated the hull, the seaworthiness of the vessel was seriously questioned.
181
 
According to news reports, it was Tongan transport minister decided that the 
Princess Ashika was seaworthy, and signed a contract stating his approval of the 
vessel being put to sea.
182
 The investigation also found that there were not 
sufficient appropriate safety measures in place for emergency situations.
183
 
According to the investigation report, the Princess Ashika was operating ‘in the 
most challenging sea environment in which it had ever been, while it was in its 
worst condition ever’.184The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Sinking of the 
Ferry Princess Ashika is reported to have said: 
 
"[T]here were many causes of the disaster. The tragedy is that they were all easily preventable and 
the deaths were completely senseless. It was scandalous that such a maritime disaster could ever 
have been allowed to occur. It was a result of systemic and individual failures".
185
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The Princess Ashika was operating between Tongan islands as a domestic vessel. 
Therefore, if the Princess Ashika were an Australian vessel, it is likely to have 
been classified as a DCV and, therefore, be regulated under the National Law. As 
with the case of the Australian Sewol, the seaworthiness obligation under the 
Navigation Act would not apply to the Australian Princess Ashika. Instead, a 
prosecuting body may only utilise the broad offence provisions under the National 
Law, and other state criminal laws. 
 
The crux of the Australian Princess Ashika appears to be the recklessness of the 
government official for allowing the vessel to be used for service. There is no 
particular evidence to demonstrate that the owner or the master of the vessel 
displayed any negligence or recklessness on their own accord. Under the National 
Law, the government official may be prosecuted for a general causing of damage 
to a vessel.
186
 The penalties for this offence, however, are relatively low: $28,800. 
It was suggested that the disaster had a particularly bad effect on Tonga due to the 
size of its population. One commentator said that the 74 Tongans drowning is the 
equivalent to 3,200 New Zealanders.
187
 This implies that there would have been a 
large degree of pressure on the prosecuting authorities to effective prosecute those 
responsible for the disaster. 
 
To this end, a prosecuting body may consider laying a charge of murder or 
manslaughter on the government official; however, this may be difficult to 
establish. To say that the official ‘legally caused’ the disaster, and therefore the 
deaths, would be difficult to argue.  The government official could potentially be 
charged with ‘acts tending to endanger vessel or crew’ under the Marine Safety 
Act 2010 (Vic), which currently has a penalty of $36,400.
188
 Not only is this 
penalty relatively low, but, as mentioned above, the Marine Safety Act 2010 (Vic) 
may be excluded by the National Law. 
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F Conclusion 
‘It is a well-known fact that the maritime sector is more reactive than pro-active in 
terms of safety, environmental protection and related legislative rule-making.’189 
Only when a maritime disaster occurs in Australian territorial waters will the 
operation of the applicable criminal laws be clearer. Even so, most of the 
decisions relating to prosecuting will be made by the prosecuting body behind 
closed doors. As such, it is unlikely that the suitability of the Australian law to 
fulfil its purposes will become clear any time soon.  
 
Those responsible for maritime disasters causing death may be prosecuted under 
Australia law, by one way or another. Not only is the Australian law highly 
variable; it is also highly flexible. The classification of the vessel as either an 
RAV, FV or DCV will affect the Commonwealth regulatory offences which 
apply, but will not alter the application of the state criminal law. An authority 
wishing to prosecute a particular party for causing a maritime disaster has a wide 
range of offences to choose from.  
 
It is recommended that lawmakers seeking to amend the law in Australia 
applicable to maritime disaster causing death, look to the recent examples of such 
events and the problems regarding effective prosecutions that they each faced. 
This allows Australia a way of being ‘reactive’ without needing to experience a 
maritime disaster within our own waters. Australian can then be more confident in 
its law, if we ever do have that experience. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has analysed the Australia law relevant to maritime disasters causing 
death. In doing this, it has explained to applicability and content of the most 
relevant Commonwealth regulatory laws. It has also considered the relevant state 
law (and the law of the Northern Territory) as it applies. The focus was whether 
the relevant Australian law fit for its purpose, both as legislation in itself and in 
the context of criminal law in general.  There are several factors to consider when 
assessing whether law will be fit for purpose 
 
Regrettably, the answer is complicated. The labyrinth of laws discussed in this 
paper does not lend themselves to a simple explanation of application. It will pose 
significant challenges to the relevant prosecuting bodies, and those within the 
maritime industry. The vagueness surrounding the jurisdiction of the Cooperative 
Scheme under the CSA, and how that operates within the limits of UNCLOS, 
means that the law will only be tested through an Australian maritime disaster and 
a finding by a competent court or tribunal. Although it has been said that maritime 
accidents are ‘beneficial’ to the development of maritime regulation,190 it is 
preferable to ensure laws are fit for their intended purpose before being required 
for that purpose. 
 
One suggestion is for the CSA to apply the law of the Jervis Bay Territory to all 
vessels operating in Australia’s territorial waters. Though a uniform system of 
criminal law in Australia’s territorial waters would be beneficial to seafarers, 
there are several other implications: 
 The prosecuting authorities of each state would be required to understand 
and enforce the law of the ACT; 
 There may be serious questions of constitutionality surrounding a uniform 
system of criminal law applying at sea;  
 The purpose of several of the changes to maritime laws that were made in 
2012 would be defeated; and 
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 The state governments that enforce the laws of the ACT would have no 
ability to alter those laws in their own state, which would affect the 
implementation of state-specific public policy. 
 
Assuming that the issue of jurisdiction is determined, there are then serious 
questions to be raised about the regulatory offences provided by Commonwealth 
statutes. For example, the offences relating to unseaworthiness under the 
Navigation Act appears to be problematic for several reasons. If then, a 
prosecuting body decides to enforce the criminal law of the state (or Northern 
Territory), the applicable laws will be highly variable from state-to-state. Crossing 
a maritime border may mean that a master is liable for murder, rather than 
manslaughter. 
 
The criticism is not necessarily that the Australian law is too lenient or too strict. 
Instead, the law is vague and variable between the states (and between the two 
regulatory schemes). There are some parties that are likely to escape liability for 
maritime disasters due to the inability of the law to prosecute. In the context of 
state criminal law, a maritime disaster in one state may attract a limited amount of 
liability, whilst the same disaster in another jurisdiction may attract several 
serious criminal charges.   
 
A Issue for the Future 
Technological developments have made maritime navigation more accurate and 
safer over a number of years.
191
With these advances, there is less responsibility 
left to individuals. Due to the highly technical nature of modern shipping, there is 
far less room for human error. This means that the standards for masters and 
seafarers have been raised and authorities are likely to be under more pressure to 
prosecute for offending conduct. 
 
With the shipping industry continuing to advance technologically, autonomous 
seafaring vessels may become by prevalent. The obvious question that arises in 
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relation to these vessels is: if there is no master on board, who do the master’s 
duties fall to? In the context of the issues raised by this paper, the lack of master 
to scapegoat following a maritime disaster may mean that prosecuting bodies are 
required to investigate more broadly into the chain of responsibility. If 
prosecuting bodies encounter difficulties with a prosecution of that kind 
(particularly under the Navigation Act), it may prompt further changes in the law 
to be more applicable to those other than owners and masters. 
 
C Final Comments 
The title of this paper is borrowed from a television programme. In it, the main 
character sings: 
You’re a crook, Captain Hook. 
Judge, won’t you throw the book?192 
  
As this paper demonstrates, the lyrics are quite appropriate to describe the 
situation seafarers currently face around the world. Prosecuting authorities are 
‘throwing the book’ at seafarers due to the external pressure that they face. The 
result is that masters are being charged with causing death caused even if they are 
not the only party responsible for that death. Though reducing worldwide 
criminalisation is a monumental task, Australian lawmakers should focus on 
ensuring that the laws in Australia are fit for purpose such that they are clear, 
consistent and readily enforced. 
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